In “Could You Merge With AI?,” Susan Schneider explores the concept of human consciousness interacting with AI. Schneider addresses merging a person’s mind with AI as well as uploading a mind to a computer, while highlighting key concerns about the mind’s persistence. Using the concept of humans interfacing with artificial intelligence, Schneider addresses transhumanism and her own approach to the conception of the person. Furthermore, she examines the underlying ethical and moral concerns regarding the status of artificial intelligence in relation to humanity. Analysing the excerpt above provides insight into the author’s perspectives on tranhumanist theories and how they are concerned with consciousness, interfacing with technology, and ethical arguments when applied to the entire passage.
Susan Schneider addresses transhumanism as the pursuit of modifying the human body with technology, primarily in order to enhance the human far beyond current standards. “Could You Merge With AI?,” considers artificial intelligence and how it may be used to approach arguments surrounding consciousness. She first provides the reader with four preexisting notions of the persisting self, which are psychological continuity, brain-based materialism, soul theory, and no-self view (Schneider 76). Then, Schneider explains the implications behind each of these in the scenario of integrating the human with technology. Psychological continuity, the theory that proposes that an individual is only their memories and ability to reflect on oneself, would require the memories and reflection to be preserved in any new form the brain takes. Brain-based materialism is the claim that thought is dependent on the very substance of the brain, and therefore, the mind may not persist if the brain changes(77). The fourth and final belief, no-self theory, would not be concerned with the survival of the self, as the belief rejects a notion of self (77). She finds these insufficient in conditions to approach uploading with regards to transhumanism, as they all lack a key distinction with regarding the mind and the person.
Schneider then introduces the concept of patternism, a key term in developing her perspective on consciousness. She defines patternism as a computational approach to the mind that borrows traits from the psychological continuity view. To introduce the concept, she recalls the computational theory of the mind, an outdated theory claiming that the brain physically functions in the same way as a traditional computer (77). Although Schneider and other proponents of patternism concede that the traditional computational theory to the mind does not accurately express the structure of the brain, proponents of this theory adopt the computational approach in order to address the nonphysical components of the mind, such as memory and perception (78). She refers to this new approach as the Software Approach to the Mind (SAM), which Schneider then uses to further develop her definition of patternism. The SAM theory claims that the mind is equivalent to the software or programs that run on a computer.
Schneider asserts that the SAM requires patternism, because its proponents fail to address personal identity as a property. However, she argues that the persistence of the mind is a concern for SAM proponents, which remains unaddressed as long as they fail to address the persistence of the person. Schneider then claims that transhumanists seek a connection between the mind and personal identity, in order to permit the modification of the mind without death. The Kurzweil excerpt that Schneider cites depicts this relationship in the shifting bodily particles, which shows the dynamic substance of a person, while also defining the configuration of the mind to be as an algorithmic pattern (80). Transhumanists define this pattern to be composed by information like memories, values, attitudes, and emotions (81). Since all of these may conceivably be expressed as data, Schneider believes that patternism allows transhumanists to subvert concerns surrounding the preservation of the person in “uploading”.
An underlying concept of Schneider’s essay is the ethical concerns of the beliefs of transhumanists regarding AI. Schneider’s conception of consciousness and the mind is based on patterns, which are modelled after computational algorithms. Since the essential components of the person are their patterns, one who believes in patternism may consider AI as a standalone consciousness that may be perceived as a person. A clarifying distinction must be made in order for one to distinguish between a person and a human. A human refers to the physical human, in the body and DNA, whereas a person is the intangible mind and consciousness. The status of personhood concerns whether or not artificial intelligence must be given the same rights as a human, given that AI does not necessarily have an organic body but could potentially meet the criterion of “human”. In considering the personhood of humans to be patternistic in a way that may be expressed computationally, patternism would also allows for artificial intelligences that is conscious in the same way as humans.
Introducing AI as an entity that may be qualified as a person allows Schneider to further defend her theory morally, as this entity would thus deserve similar rights and treatment. The other aforementioned theories of personal identity would either fail or have difficulty in identifying an artificial intelligence as a person and thus defending it having the same rights as one. However, with respect to a human’s intuition, an AI that can act and speak as a human would be indistinguishable from and be entitled to enjoy the same privileges of personhood, such as the freedoms of speech, mind, and “body”. Thus, patternism resolves the conflict that concerns many other theories.
For Schneider, patternism straddles the line between a theory of personal identity and a theory of the mind. As a product of the twofold existence that it enjoys, patternism avoids the pitfalls that other theories may encounter while appealing to other forms of personal identity. Schneider leaves the reader with an understanding of the consequences of AI and its possible personhood, leaving unresolved the question of whether or not a nonhuman may still deserve the same rights. Using patternism, Schneider fleshes out the answers to many of the questions that worry transhumanists, while simultaneously raising questions as a product of merging theories of personhood and persistence of the mind. If patternism holds true, one must be concerned with a future where artificial intelligences are indistinguishable from human intelligences. Thus, transhumanists must discern between human and artificial intelligences, or choose to not differentiate the two.
Work Cited
Schneider, Susan. “Could You Merge With AI?” Artificial You: AI and the Future of Your Mind, Princeton University Press, 2019, pp. 72–81. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvfjd00r.8. Accessed 24 Oct. 2023.
